80 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



cession and simultaneity, of likeness and unlikeness. These, 

 not being grounded on any fact or phenomenon distinct from 

 the related objects themselves, do not admit of the same kind 

 of analysis. But these relations, though not, like other rela 

 tions, grounded on states of consciousness, are themselves 

 states of consciousness : resemblance is nothing but our feeling 

 of resemblance ; succession is nothing but our feeling of suc 

 cession. Or, if this be disputed (and we cannot, without 

 transgressing the bounds of our science, discuss it here), at 

 least our knowledge of these relations, and even our possibility 

 of knowledge, is confined to those which subsist between 

 sensations, or other states of consciousness ; for, though we 

 ascribe resemblance, or succession, or simultaneity, to objects 

 and to attributes, it is always in virtue of resemblance or suc 

 cession or simultaneity in the sensations or states of con 

 sciousness which those objects excite, and on which those 

 attributes are grounded. 



14. In the preceding investigation we have, for the 

 sake of simplicity, considered bodies only, and omitted minds. 

 But what we have said, is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the 

 latter. The attributes of minds, as well as those of bodies, 

 are grounded on states of feeling or consciousness. But in 

 the case of a mind,, we have to consider its own states, as 

 well as those which it produces in other minds. Every attri 

 bute of a mind consists either in being itself affected in a 

 certain way, or affecting other minds in a certain way. Con 

 sidered in itself, we can predicate nothing of it but the series 

 of its own feelings. When we say of any mind, that it is 

 devout, or superstitious, or meditative, or cheerful, we mean 

 that the ideas, emotions, or volitions implied in those words, 

 form a frequently recurring part of the series of feelings, or 

 states of consciousness, which fill up the sentient existence of 

 that mind. 



In addition, however, to those attributes of a mind which 



are grounded on its own states of feeling, attributes may also 



be ascribed to it, in the same manner as to a body, grounded 



on the feelings which it excites in other minds. A mind does 



