82 NAMES AND PROPOSITION S. 



to be, conveyed. Feelings are of four sorts: Sensations, 

 Thoughts, Emotions, and Volitions,. What are called Per 

 ceptions are merely a particular case of Belief, and belief is a 

 kind of thought. Actions are merely volitions followed by an 

 effect. If there be any other kind of mental state not included 

 under these subdivisions, we did not think it necessary or 

 proper in this place to discuss its existence, or the rank which 

 ought to be assigned to it. 



After Feelings we proceeded to Substances. These are 

 either Bodies or Minds. Without entering into the grounds 

 of the metaphysical doubts which have been raised concerning 

 the existence of Matter and Mind as objective realities, we 

 stated as sufficient for us the conclusion in which the best 

 thinkers are now for the most part agreed, that all we can 

 know of Matter is the sensations which it gives us, and the 

 order of occurrence of those sensations ; and that while the 

 substance Body is the unknown cause of our sensations, the 

 substance Mind is the unknown recipient. 



The only remaining class of Nameable Things is Attributes; 

 and these are of three kinds, Quality, Kelation, and Quantity. 

 Qualities, like substances, are known to us no otherwise than 

 by the sensations or other states of consciousness which they 

 excite : and while, in compliance with common usage, we have 

 continued to speak of them as a distinct class of Things, we 

 showed that in predicating them no one means to predicate 

 anything but those sensations or states of consciousness, on 

 which they may be said to be grounded, and by which alone 

 they can be defined or described. Kelations, except the simple 

 cases of likeness and unlikeness, succession and simultaneity, 

 are similarly grounded on some fact or phenomenon, that is, 

 on some series of sensations or states of consciousness, more 

 or less complicated. The third species of Attribute, Quantity, 

 is also manifestly grounded on something in our sensations 

 or states of feeling, since there is an indubitable difference in 

 the sensations excited by a larger and a smaller bulk, or by a 

 greater or a less degree of intensity, in any object of sense or of 

 consciousness. All attributes, therefore, are to us nothing but 

 either our sensations and other states of feeling, or something 



