IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 97 



and the whole doctrine of Propositions, together with the 

 theory of Reasoning, (always necessarily founded on the theory 

 of Propositions,) was stated as if Ideas, or Conceptions, or 

 whatever other terra the writer preferred as a name for mental 

 representations generally, constituted essentially the subject 

 matter and suhstance of those operations. 



It is, of course, true, that in any case of judgment, as for 

 instance when we judge that gold is yellow, a process takes 

 place in our minds, of which some one or other of these theories 

 is a partially correct account. We must have the idea of gold 

 and the idea of yellow, and these two ideas must be brought 

 together in our mind. But in the first place, it is evident that 

 this is only a part of what takes place ; for we may put two 

 ideas together without any act of belief; as when we merely 

 imagine something, such as a golden mountain ; or when we 

 actually disbelieve : for in order even to disbelieve that 

 Mahomet was an apostle of God, we must put the idea of 

 Mahomet and that of an apostle of God together. To determine 

 what it is that happens in the case of assent or dissent besides 

 putting two ideas together, is one of the most intricate of 

 metaphysical problems. But whatever the solution may be, 

 we may venture to assert that it can have nothing whatever 

 to do with the import of propositions; for this reason, that 

 propositions (except sometimes when the mind itself is the 

 subject treated of) are not assertions respecting our ideas of 

 things, but assertions respecting the things themselves. In 

 order to believe that gold is yellow, I must, indeed, have the 

 idea of gold, and the idea of yellow, and something having re 

 ference to those ideas must take place in my mind; but my 

 belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the 

 things. What I believe, is a fact relating to the outward 

 thing, gold, and to the impression made by that outward thing 

 upon the human organs ; not a fact relating to my conception 

 of gold, which would be a fact in my mental history, not a 

 fact of external nature. It is true, that in order to believe 

 this fact in external nature, another fact must take place in 

 my mind, a process must be performed upon my ideas ; but 

 so it must in everything else that I do. I cannot dig the 

 VOL. i. 7 



