114 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



has a few anomalous genera or species on its borders, which 

 are admitted into it by a sort of courtesy, and concerning 

 which it has been matter of discussion to what family they 

 properly belonged. Now when the class-name is predicated 

 of any object of this description, we do, by so predicating it, 

 affirm resemblance and nothing more. And in order to be 

 scrupulously correct it ought to be said, that in every case in 

 which we predicate a general name, we affirm, not absolutely 

 that the object possesses the properties designated by the 

 name, but that it either possesses those properties, or if it does 

 not, at any rate resembles the things which do so, more than 

 it resembles any other things. In most cases, however, it is 

 unnecessary to suppose any such alternative, the latter of the 

 two grounds being very seldom that on which the assertion is 

 made : and when it is, there is generally some slight differ 

 ence in the form of the expression, as, This species (or genus) 

 is considered, or may be ranked, as belonging to such and such 

 a family : we should hardly say positively that it does belong 

 to it, unless it possessed unequivocally the properties of which 

 the class-name is scientifically significant. 



There is still another exceptional case, in which, though 

 the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we 

 affirm nothing but resemblance, the class being founded not 

 on resemblance in any given particular, but on general unana 

 lysable resemblance. The classes in question are those into 

 which our simple sensations, or other simple feelings, are 

 divided. Sensations of white, for instance, are classed toge 

 ther, not because we can take them to pieces, and say they 

 are alike in this, and not alike in that, but because we feel 

 them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees. 

 When, therefore, I say, The colour I saw yesterday was a 

 white colour, or, The sensation I feel is one of tightness, in 

 both cases the attribute I affirm of the colour or of the other 

 sensation is mere resemblance simple likeness to sensations 

 which I have had before, and which have had those names 

 bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other con 

 crete general names, are connotative ; but they connote a 

 mere resemblance. When predicated of any individual feeling, 



