IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 117 



noting the attribute which these denote. &quot;Prudence is a 

 virtue :&quot; this may be rendered, &quot; All prudent persons, in so 

 far as prudent, are virtuous :&quot; &quot; Courage is deserving of 

 honour,&quot; thus, &quot;All courageous persons are deserving of 

 honour in so far as they are courageous :&quot; which is equiva 

 lent to this &quot;All courageous persons deserve an addition 

 to the honour, or a diminution of the disgrace, which would 

 attach to them on other grounds.&quot; 



In order to throw still further light upon the import 

 of propositions of which the terms are abstract, we will sub 

 ject one of the examples given above to a minuter analysis. 

 The proposition we shall select is the following : &quot; Prudence 

 is a virtue.&quot; Let us substitute for the word virtue an equiva 

 lent but more definite expression, such as &quot; a mental quality 

 beneficial to society,&quot; or &quot; a mental quality pleasing to God,&quot; 

 or whatever else we adopt as the definition of virtue. What 

 the proposition asserts is a sequence, accompanied with causa 

 tion ; namely, that benefit to society, or that the approval of 

 God, is consequent on, and caused by, prudence. Here is a 

 sequence ; but between what ? We understand the consequent 

 of the sequence, but we have yet to analyse the antecedent. 

 Prudence is an attribute; and, in connexion with it, two 

 things besides itself are to be considered ; prudent persons, 

 who are the subjects of the attribute, and prudential conduct, 

 which may be called the foundation of it. Now is either of 

 these the antecedent ? and, first, is it meant, that the approval 

 of God, or benefit to society, is attendant upon all prudent per 

 sons? No; except in so far as they are prudent; for prudent 

 persons who are scoundrels can seldom on the whole be bene 

 ficial to society, nor can they be acceptable to a good being. Is 

 it upon prudential conduct, then, that divine approbation and 

 benefit to mankind are supposed to be invariably consequent ? 

 Neither is this the assertion meant, when it is said that pru 

 dence is a virtue ; except with the same reservation as before, 

 and for the same reason, namely, that prudential conduct, 

 although in so far as it is prudential it is beneficial to society, 

 may yet, by reason of some other of its qualities, be productive 

 of an injury outweighing the benefit, and deserve a displeasure 



