164 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



designation neither of a thing nor of a name, but of an idea. 

 We then have 



The idea of a dragon is an idea of a thing which breathes 

 flame : 



The idea of a dragon is an idea of a serpent : 



Therefore, there is an idea of a serpent, which is an idea of 

 a thing breathing flame. 



Here the conclusion is true, and also the premises ; but the 

 premises are not definitions. They are propositions affirming 

 that an idea existing in the mind, includes certain ideal ele 

 ments. The truth of the conclusion follows from the existence 

 of the psychological phenomenon called the idea of a dragon ; 

 and therefore still from the tacit assumption of a matter of 

 fact.* 



When, as in this last syllogism, the conclusion is a propo- 



* In the only attempt which, so far as I know, has been made to refute 

 the preceding argumentation, it is maintained that in the first form of the 

 syllogism, 



A dragon is a thing which breathes flame, 



A dragon is a serpent, 



Therefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame, 



&quot;there is just as much truth in the conclusion as there is in the premises, or 

 rather, no more in the latter than in the former. If the general name serpent 

 includes both real and imaginary serpents, there is no falsity in the conclusion ; 

 if not, there is falsity in the minor premise.&quot; 



Let us, then, try to set out the syllogism on the hypothesis that the name 

 serpent includes imaginary serpents. We shall find that it is now necessary to 

 alter the predicates ; for it cannot be asserted that an imaginary creature 

 breathes flame : in predicating of it such a fact, we assert by the most positive 

 implication that it is real and not imaginary. The conclusion must run thus, 

 &quot; Some serpent or serpents either do or are imagined to breathe flame.&quot; And 

 to prove this conclusion by the instance of dragons, the premises must be, A 

 dragon is imagined as breathing flame, A dragon is a (real or imaginary) ser 

 pent : from which it undoubtedly follows, that there are serpents which are 

 imagined to breathe flame ; but tlie major premise is not a definition, nor part 

 of a definition ; which is all that I am concerned to prove. 



Let us now examine the other , issertion that if the word serpent stands for 

 none but real serpents, the minor premise (a dragon is a serpent) is false. This 

 is exactly what I have myself said of the premise, considered as a statement of 

 fact : but it is not false as part of the definition of a dragon ; and since the 

 premises, or one of them, must be false, (the conclusion being so,) the real 

 emise cannot be the definition, which is true, but the statement of fact, 

 which is false. 



