DEFINITION. 167 



of all physical objects in so far as possessing length. But 

 even what I hold to he the false doctrine on the subject, 

 leaves the conclusion that our reasonings are grounded on the 

 matters of fact postulated in definitions, and not on the de 

 finitions themselves, entirely unaffected ; and accordingly this 

 conclusion is one which I have in common with Dr. Whew ell, 

 in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences : though, on the 

 nature of demonstrative truth, Dr. Whewell s opinions are 

 greatly at variance with mine. And here, as in many other 

 instances, I gladly acknowledge that his writings are emi 

 nently serviceable in clearing from confusion the initial steps 

 in the analysis of the mental processes, even where his views 

 respecting the ultimate analysis are such as (though with un 

 feigned respect) I cannot but regard as fundamentally erroneous. 



7. Although, according to the opinion here presented, 

 Definitions are properly of names only, and not of things, it 

 does not follow from this that definitions are arbitrary. How 

 to define a name, may not only be an inquiry of considerable 

 difficulty and intricacy, but may involve considerations going 

 deep into the nature of the things which are denoted by the 

 name. Such, for instance, are the inquiries which form the 

 subjects of the most important of Plato s Dialogues; as, 

 &quot; What is rhetoric ?&quot; the topic of the Gorgias, or &quot; What is 

 justice?&quot; that of the Republic. Such, also, is the question 

 scornfully asked by Pilate, &quot; What is truth ?&quot; and the fun 

 damental question with speculative moralists in all ages, 

 &quot; What is virtue ?&quot; 



It would be a mistake to represent these difficult ami 

 noble inquiries as having nothing in view beyond ascertaining 

 the conventional meaning of a name. They are inquiries not 

 so much to determine what is, as what should be, the meaning 

 of a name ; which, like other practical questions of terminology, 

 requires for its solution that we should enter, and sometimes 

 enter very deeply, into the properties not merely of names but 

 of the things named. 



Although the meaning of every concrete general name 

 resides in the attributes which it connotes, the objects wre 



