FUNCTIONS AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 217 



confused in the theory of Archbishop Whately and other 

 enlightened defenders of the syllogistic doctrine, respecting 

 the limits to which its functions are confined. They affirm in 

 as explicit terms as can be used, that the sole office of general 

 reasoning is to prevent inconsistency in our opinions; to pre 

 vent us from assenting to anything, the truth of which would 

 contradict something to which we had previously on good 

 grounds given our assent. And they tell us, that the sole 

 ground which a syllogism affords for assenting to the conclu 

 sion, is that the supposition of its being false, combined with 

 the supposition that the premises are true, would lead to a 

 contradiction in terms. Now this would be but a lame 

 account of the real grounds which we have for believing the 

 facts which we learn from reasoning, in contradistinction to 

 observation. The true reason why we believe that the Duke 

 of Wellington will die, is that his fathers, and our fathers, 

 and all other persons who were cotemporary with them, have 

 died. Those facts are the real premises of the reasoning. But 

 we are not led to infer the conclusion from those premises, 

 by the necessity of avoiding any verbal inconsistency. There 

 is no contradiction in supposing that all those persons have 

 died, and that the Duke of Wellington may, notwithstand 

 ing, live for ever. But there would be a contradiction if we 

 first, on the ground of those same premises, made a general 

 assertion including and covering the case of the Duke of 

 Wellington, and then refused to stand to it in the individual 

 case. There is an inconsistency to be avoided between the 

 memorandum we make of the inferences which may be justly 

 drawn in future cases, and the inferences we actually draw in 

 those cases when they arise. With this view we interpret our 

 own formula, precisely as a judge interprets a law : in order 

 that we may avoid drawing any inferences not conformable to 

 our former intention, as a judge avoids giving any decision 

 not conformable to the legislator s intention. The rules for 

 this interpretation are the rules of the syllogism : and its 

 sole purpose is to maintain consistency between the conclu 

 sions we draw in every particular case, and the previous 

 general directions for drawing them ; whether those general 



