224 REASONING. 



the appeal to former experience. The absurdity of this was 

 disguised from him by the opinion he adopted, that reasoning 

 is merely analysing our own general notions, or abstract ideas ; 

 and that the proposition, Socrates is mortal, is evolved from 

 the proposition, Socrates is a man, simply by recognising the 

 notion of mortality as already contained in the notion we form 

 of a man. 



After the explanations so fully entered into on the subject 

 of propositions, much further discussion cannot be necessary 

 to make the radical error of this view of ratiocination apparent. 

 If the word man connoted mortality ; if the meaning of 

 &quot;mortal&quot; were involved in the meaning of &quot;man ;&quot; we might, 

 undoubtedly, evolve the conclusion from the minor alone, 

 because the minor would have already asserted it. But if, 

 as is in fact the case, the word man does not connote mortality, 

 how does it appear that in the mind of every person who 

 admits Socrates to be a man, the idea of man must include 

 the idea of mortality ? Dr. Brown could not help seeing this 

 difficulty, and in order to avoid it, was led, contrary to his 

 intention, to re-establish, under another name, that step in 

 the argument which corresponds to the major, by affirming 

 the necessity of previously perceiving the relation between the 

 idea of man and the idea of mortal. If the reasoner has 

 not previously perceived this relation, he will not, says Dr. 

 Brown, infer because Socrates is a man, that Socrates is 

 mortal. But even this admission, though amounting to a 

 surrender of the doctrine that an argument consists of the 

 minor and the conclusion alone, will not save the remainder of 

 Dr. Brown s theory. The failure of assent to the argument 

 does not take place merely because the reasoner, for want of 

 due analysis, does not perceive that his idea of man includes 

 the idea of mortality; it takes place, much more commonly, 

 because in his mind that relation between the two ideas has 

 never existed. And in truth it never does exist, except as the 

 result of experience. Consenting, for the sake of the argu 

 ment, to discuss the question on a supposition of which we 

 have recognised the radical incorrectness, namely, that the 

 meaning of a proposition relates to the ideas of the thing* 



