FUNCTIONS AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 231 



9. The preceding considerations enable us to under 

 stand the true nature of what is termed, by recent writers, 

 Formal Logic, and the relation between it and Logic in the 

 widest sense. Logic, as I conceive it, is the entire theory of 



eluded in the class,&quot; is a mere identical proposition, since the class is nothing 

 but the things included in it. But he thinks this defect would be cured by 

 wording the maxim thus, &quot; Whatever is true of a class, is true of everything 

 which can be shown to be a member of the class :&quot; as if a thing could &quot; be 

 shown &quot; to be a member of the class without being one. If a class means the 

 sum of all the th ings included in the class, the things which can &quot;be shown &quot; 

 to be included in it are part of the sum, and the dictum is as much an identical 

 proposition with respect to them as to the rest. One would almost imagine that, 

 in the reviewer s opinion, things are not members of a class until they are called 

 up publicly to take their place in it that so long, in fact, as Socrates is not 

 known to be a man, he is not a man, and any assertion which can be made con 

 cerning men does not at all regard him, nor is affected as to its truth or falsity 

 by anything in which he is concerned. 



The difference between the reviewer s theory and mine may be thus stated. 

 Both admit that when we say, All men are mortal, we make an assertion reach, 

 ing beyond the sphere of our knowledge of individual cases ; and that when a 

 new individual, Socrates, is brought within the field of our knowledge by 

 means of the minor premise, we learn that we have already made an assertion 

 respecting Socrates without knowing it : our own general formula being, to that 

 extent, for the first time interpreted to us. But according to the reviewer s 

 theory, the smaller assertion is proved by the larger : while I contend, that both 

 assertions are proved together, by the same evidence, namely, the grounds of 

 experience on which the general assertion was made, and by which it must be 

 justified. 



The reviewer says, that if the major premise included the conclusion, &quot; we 

 should be able to affirm the conclusion without the intervention of the minor 

 premise ; but every one sees that that is impossible.&quot; A similar argument is 

 urged by Mr. De Morgan (Formal Logic, p. 2fi9) : &quot;The whole objection 

 tacitly assumes the superfluity of the minor ; that is, tacitly assumes we know 

 Socrates* to be a man as soon as we know him to be Socrates.&quot; The objection 

 would be well grounded if the assertion that the major premise includes the 

 conclusion, meant that it individually specifies all it includes. As however the 

 only indication it gives is a description by marks, we have still to compare any 

 new individual with the marks ; and to show that this comparison has been 

 made, is the office of the minor. But since, by supposition, the new individual 

 has the marks, whether we have ascertained him to have them or not ; if we 

 have affirmed the major premise, we have asserted him to be mortal. Now my 

 position is that this assertion cannot be a necessary part of the argument. It 

 cannot be a necessary condition of reasoning that we should begin by making 



* Mr. De Morgan says &quot; Plato,&quot; but to prevent confusion I have kept to my 

 own exemplum. 



