THEORIES CONCERNING AXIOMS. 305 



an infant by stories of ghosts, though he disbelieves them in 

 after years (and perhaps disbelieved them at first), may be 

 unable all his life to be in a dark place, in circumstances stimu 

 lating to the imagination, without mental discomposure. The 

 idea of ghosts, with all its attendant terrors, is irresistibly 

 called up in his mind by the outward circumstances. 

 Mr. Spencer may say, that while he is under the influence of 

 this terror he does not disbelieve in ghosts, but has a tem 

 porary and uncontrollable belief in them. Be it so ; but 

 allowing it to be so, which would it be truest to say of this 

 man on the whole that he believes in ghosts, or that he does 

 not believe in them ? Assuredly that he does not believe in 

 them. The case is similar with those who disbelieve a material 

 world. Though they cannot get rid of the idea ; though while 

 looking at a solid object they cannot help having the concep 

 tion, and therefore, according to Mr. Spencer s metaphysics, 

 the momentary belief, of its externality ; even at that moment 

 they would sincerely deny holding that belief: and it would 

 be incorrect to call them other than disbelievers of the doc 

 trine. The belief therefore is not invariable ; and the test of 

 inconceivableness fails in the only cases to which there could 

 ever be any occasion to apply it. 



That a thing may be perfectly believable, and yet may 

 not have become conceivable, and that we may habitually 

 believe one side of an alternative, and conceive only in the 

 other, is familiarly exemplified in the state of mind of educated 

 persons respecting sunrise and sunset. All educated persons 

 either know by investigation, or believe on the authority of 

 science, that it is the earth and not the sun which moves : 

 but there are probably few who habitually conceive the pheno 

 menon otherwise than as the ascent or descent of the sun. 

 Assuredly no one can do so without a prolonged trial ; and it 

 is probably not easier now than in the first generation after 

 Copernicus. Mr. Spencer does not say, &quot; In looking at sun 

 rise it is impossible not to conceive that it is the sun which 

 moves, therefore this is what everybody believes, and we have 

 all the evidence for it that we can have for any truth.&quot; Yet 

 VOL. i. 20 



