358 INDUCTION. 



on astrology, or on the weather-prophecies in almanacs, were 

 doubtless inductions supposed to be grounded on experience :* 

 and faith in such delusions seems quite capabh of holding oat 

 against a great multitude of failures, provided it be nourished 

 by a reasonable humber of casual coincidences between the 

 prediction and the event. What has really put an end to 

 these insufficient inductions, is their inconsistency with the 

 stronger inductions subsequently obtained by scientific inquiry, 

 respecting the causes on which terrestrial events really depend ; 

 and where those scientific truths have not yet penetrated, the 

 same or similar delusions still prevail. 



It may be affirmed as a general principle, that all induc 

 tions, whether strong or weak, whicn can be connected by 

 ratiocination, are confirmatory of one another; while any 

 which lead deductively to consequences that are incompatible, 



* Dr. Whewell (Phil, of Discov. p. 246) will not allow these and similar 

 erroneous judgments to be called inductions ; inasmuch as such superstitious 

 fancies &quot; were not collected from the facts by seeking a law of their occurrence, 

 but were suggested by an imagination of the anger of superior powers, shown 

 by such deviations from the ordinary course of nature.&quot; I conceive the ques 

 tion to be, not in what manner these notions were at first suggested, but by 

 what evidence they have, from time to time, been supposed to be substantiated. 

 If the believers in these erroneous opinions had been put on their defence, they 

 would have referred to experience : to the comet which preceded the assassina 

 tion of Julius Caesar, or to oracles and other prophecies known to have been 

 fulfilled. It is by such appeals to facts that all analogous superstitions, even in 

 our day, attempt to justify themselves ; the supposed evidence of experience 

 is necessary to their hold on the mind. I quite admit that the influence 

 of such coincidences would not be what it is, if strength were not lent to it by 

 an antecedent presumption ; but this is not peculiar to such cases ; preconceived 

 notions of probability form part of the explanation of many other cases of belief 

 on insufficient evidence. The d priori prejudice does not prevent the erroneous 

 opinion from being sincerely regarded as a legitimate conclusion from experience ; 

 though it improperly predisposes the mind to that interpretation of experience. 



Thus much in defence of the sort of examples objected to. But it would 

 be easy to produce instances, equally adapted to the purpose, and in which no 

 antecedent prejudice is at all concerned. &quot; For many ages,&quot; says Archbishop 

 Whately, &quot; all fanners and gardeners were firmly convinced and convinced 

 of their knowing it by experience that the crops would never turn out good 

 unless the seed were sown during the increase of the moon.&quot; This was 

 induction, but bad induction : just as a vicious syllogism is reasoning, but bad 

 reasoning. 



