388 INDUCTION. 



it is a cause, in a different sense from that in which physical 

 phenomena are said to cause one another : it is an Efficient 

 Cause. From this the transition is easy to the further doc 

 trine, that Volition is the sole Efficient Cause of all pheno 

 mena. &quot; It is inconceivable that dead force could continue 

 unsupported for a moment beyond its creation. We cannot 

 even conceive of change or phenomena without the energy of 

 a mind.&quot; &quot; The word action&quot; itself, says another writer of 

 the same school, &quot; has no real significance except when applied 

 to the doings of an intelligent agent. Let any one conceive, 

 if he can, of any power, energy, or force, inherent in a lump 

 of matter.&quot; Phenomena may have the semblance of being 

 produced by physical causes, but they are in reality produced, 

 say these writers, by the immediate agency of mind. All 

 things which do not proceed from a human (or, I suppose, an 

 animal) will, proceed, they say, directly from divine will. 

 The earth is not moved by the combination of a centripetal 

 and a projectile force ; this is but a mode of speaking, which 

 serves to facilitate our conceptions. It is moved by the direct 

 volition of an omnipotent Being, in a path coinciding with 

 that which we deduce from the hypothesis of these two forces. 

 As I have so often observed, the general question of the 

 existence of Efficient Causes does not fall within the limits of 

 our subject: but a theory which represents them as capable of 

 being subjects of human knowledge, and which passes off as 

 efficient causes what are only physical or phenomenal causes, 

 belongs as much to Logic as to Metaphysics, and is a fit 

 subject for discussion here. 



To my apprehension, a volition is not an efficient, but 

 simply ajjiysical, cause. Our will causes our bodily actions 

 in the same sense, and in no other, in which cold causes ice, 

 or a spark causes an explosion of gunpowder. The volition, 

 a state of our mind, is the antecedent ; the motion of our 

 limbs in conformity to the volition, is the consequent. This 

 sequence I conceive to be not a subject of direct consciousness, 

 in the sense intended by the theory. The antecedent, indeed, 

 and the consequent, are subjects of consciousness. But the 

 connexion between them is a subjecU)f ^experience. I cannot 



