CONTEXTS. IX 



CHAPTER II. Of Abstraction, or the Formation of 

 Conceptions. 



PAGE 



1 . The comparison which is a preliminary to induction implies 

 general conceptions .... 



2. but these need not be pre-existent . . . 194 



3. A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, 



becomes itself the type of comparison . . . 198 



4. What is meant by appropriate conceptions . 200 



5. and by clear conceptions .... 203 



6. Further illustration of the subject . . .205 



CHAPTER III. Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction. 



1. The fundamental property of names as an instrument of 



thought -209 



2. Names are not indispensable to induction 



3. In what manner subservient to it . 



4. General names not a mere contrivance to economize the 



use of language . . .213 



CHAPTER IV. Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Lan 

 guage, and the Principles of Definition. 



1. First requisite of philosophical language, a steady and 

 determinate meaning for every general name 



2. Names in common use have often a loose connotation . 215 



3. _ which the logician should fix, with as little alteration 



as possible . 



4. Why definition is often a question not of words but of 



things 

 5 How the logician should deal with the transitive applica- 



c -i 224 



tions ot words .... 



6. Evil consequences of casting off any portion of the cus 

 tomary connotation of words 



