70 INDUCTION. 



same : the larger ball would be much more likely to meet the 

 hand.&quot;* 



It is, in fact, evident, that when once causation is ad 

 mitted as an universal law, our expectation of events can 

 only be rationally grounded on that law. To a person who 

 recognises that every event depends on causes, a thing s 

 having happened once is a reason for expecting it to happen 

 again, only because proving that there exists, or is liable to 

 exist, a cause adequate to produce it.f The frequency of 

 the particular event, apart from all surmise respecting its 

 cause, can give rise to no other induction than that per 

 enumerationem simplicem; and the precarious inferences 

 derived from this, are superseded, and disappear from the 

 field, as soon as the principle of causation makes its appear 

 ance there. 



Notwithstanding, however, the abstract superiority of an 

 estimate of probability grounded on causes, it is a fact that 

 in almost all cases in which chances admit of estimation suffi- 



* Prospective Review for February 1850. 



( &quot; If thia be not so, why do we feel so much more probability added by 

 the first instance, than by any single subsequent instance? Why, except that 

 the first instance gives us its possibility (a cause adequate to it), while every 

 other only gives us the frequency of its conditions ? If no reference to a cause 

 be supposed, possibility would have no meaning ; yet it is clear, that, ante 

 cedent to its happening, we might have supposed the event impossible, i.e., 

 have believed that there was no physical energy really existing in the world 



equal to producing it After the first time of happening, which is, 



then, more important to the whole probability than any other single instance 

 (because proving the possibility), the number of times becomes important as an 

 index to the intensity or extent of the cause, and its independence of any par 

 ticular time. If we took the case of a tremendous leap, for instance, and 

 wished to form an estimate of the probability of its succeeding a certain 

 number of times j the first instance, by showing its possibility (before doubtful) 

 is of the most importance ; but every succeeding leap shows the power to be 

 more perfectly under control, greater and more invariable, and so increases the 

 probability ; and no one would think of reasoning in this case straight from 

 one instance to the next, without referring to the physical energy which each 

 leap indicated. Is it not then clear that we do not ever&quot; (let us rather say, 

 that we do not in an advanced state of our knowledge) &quot; conclude directly 

 from the happening of an event to the probability of its happening again ; 

 but that we refer to the cause, regarding the past cases as an index to the 

 cause, and the cause as our guide to the future]&quot; Ibid. 



