EVIDENCE OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION. 101 



from results so obtained, cannot itself rest on any better 

 foundation. 



It would seem, therefore, that induction per enumerationem 

 simplicem not only is not necessarily an illicit logical process, 

 but is in reality the only kind of induction possible; since the 

 more elaborate process depends for its validity on a law, itself 

 obtained in that inartificial mode. Is there not then an incon 

 sistency in contrasting the looseness of one method with the 

 rigidity of another, when that other is indebted to the looser 

 method for its own foundation ? 



The inconsistency, however, is only apparent. Assuredly, 

 if induction by simple enumeration were an invalid process, 

 no process grounded on it could be valid; just as no 

 reliance could be placed on telescopes, if we could not trust 

 our eyes. But though a valid process, it is a fallible one, and 

 fallible in very different degrees : if therefore we can substi 

 tute for the more fallible forms of the process, an operation 

 grounded on the same process in a less fallible form, we shall 

 have effected a very material improvement. And this is what 

 scientific induction does. 



A mode of concluding from experience must be pronounced 

 untrustworthy, when subsequent experience refuses to confirm 

 it. According to this criterion, induction by simple enumera 

 tion in other words, generalization of an observed fact from 

 the mere absence of any known instance to the contrary 

 affords in general a precarious and unsafe ground of assurance ; 

 for such generalizations are incessantly discovered, on further 

 experience, to be false. Still, however, it affords some assu 

 rance, sufficient, in many cases, for the ordinary guidance of 

 conduct. It would be absurd to say, that the generalizations 

 arrived at by mankind in the outset of their experience, such 

 as these, Food nourishes, Fire burns, Water drowns, were 

 unworthy of reliance.* There is a scale of trustworthiness in 



* It deserves remark, that these early generalizations did not, like scientific 

 inductions, presuppose causation. What they did presuppose, was uniformity in 

 physical facts. But the observers were as ready to presume uniformity in 

 the coexistences of facts as in the sequences. On the other hand, they never 

 thought of assuming that this uniformity was a principle pervading all nature : 



