CHAPTER VII. 



OF CLASSIFICATION, AS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION. 



1. THERE is, as has been frequently remarked in this 

 work, a classification of things, which is inseparable from the 

 fact of giving them general names. Every name which con 

 notes an attribute, divides, by that very fact, all things what 

 ever into two classes, those which have the attribute and those 

 which have it not ; those of which the name can be predicated, 

 and those of which it cannot. And the division thus made is 

 not merely a division of such things as actually exist, or are 

 known to exist, but of all such as may hereafter be discovered, 

 and even of all which can be imagined. 



On this kind of Classification we have nothing to add to 

 what has previously been said. The Classification which 

 requires to be discussed as a separate act of the mind, is alto 

 gether different. In the one, the arrangement of objects in 

 groups, and distribution of them into compartments, is a mere 

 incidental effect consequent on the use of names given for 

 another purpose, namely that of simply expressing some of 

 their qualities. In the other the arrangement and distribution 

 are the main object, and the naming is secondary to, and 

 purposely conforms itself to, instead of governing, that more 

 important operation. 



Classification, thus regarded, is a contrivance for the best 

 possible ordering of the ideas of objects in our minds ; for 

 causing the ideas to accompany or succeed one another in such 

 a way as shall give us the greatest command over our know 

 ledge already acquired, and lead most directly to the acqui 

 sition of more. The general problem of Classification, in 

 reference to these purposes, may be stated as follows: To 

 provide that things shall be thought of in such groups, and 



