FALLACIES OF RATIOCINATION. 383 



mon form of error it is not requisite that we should exemplify 

 here, as it will be particularly treated of hereafter in its appli 

 cation to the subjects on which it is most frequent and most 

 fatal, those of politics and society.* 



* &quot;An advocate,&quot; says Mr. De Morgan (Formal Logic, p. 270), &quot;is some 

 times guilty of the argument a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simplicitcr : it is 

 his business to do for his client all that his client might honestly do for himself. 

 Is not the word in italics frequently omitted ? Mirjht any man honestly try to 

 do for himself all that counsel frequently try to do for him ? We are often 

 reminded of the two men who stole the leg of mutton ; one could swear he had 

 not got it, the other that he had not taken it. The counsel is doing his duty 

 by his client, the client has left the matter to his counsel. Between the 

 unexecuted intention of the client, and the unintended execution of the coun 

 sel, there may be a wrong done, and, if we are to believe the usual maxims, no 

 wrong-doer.&quot; 



The same writer justly remarks (p. 251) that there is a converse fallacy, &amp;lt;l 

 dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, called by the scholastic logicians, 

 fallacia accidentis; and another which may be called a dicto secundum quid ad 

 dictum secundum alterum quid (p. 265). For apt instances of both, I must 

 refer the reader to Mr. De Morgan s able chapter on Fallacies. 



