386 FALLACIES. 



ing, faith and. faithful, &c. ; and the more slight the variation 

 of the meaning, the more likely is the fallacy to be successful ; 

 for when the words have become so widely removed in sense 

 as pity and pitiful, every one would perceive such a fal 

 lacy, nor could it be employed but in jest.* 



&quot; The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather, perhaps, 

 may be regarded as a branch of, that founded on etymology ; 

 viz. when a term is used, at one time in its customary, and at 

 another in its etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this 

 can be found that is more extensively and mischievously em 

 ployed than in the case of the word representative : assuming 

 that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict 

 and original sense of the verb represent, the sophist per 

 suades the multitude, that a member of the House of Com 

 mons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of his 

 constituents; and, in short, to be merely their spokesman; 

 whereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered 

 as fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but 

 enjoin the representative to act according to the best of his 

 own judgment, and on his own responsibility.&quot; 



The following are instances of great practical impor 

 tance, in which arguments are habitually founded on a verbal 

 ambiguity. 



The mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy 

 by the phrase, &quot; scarcity of money.&quot; In the language of com 

 merce &quot;money&quot; has two meanings: currency, or the circu 

 lating medium ; and capital seeking investment, especially 

 investment on loan. In this last sense the word is used when 

 the &quot; money market &quot; is spoken of, and when the &quot; value of 

 money&quot; is said to be high or low, the rate of interest being 



* An example of this fallacy is the popular error that strong drink must 

 be a cause of strength. There is here fallacy within fallacy ; for granting that 

 the words &quot;strong&quot; and &quot;strength&quot; were not (as they are) applied in a totally 

 different sense to fermented liquors and to the human body, there would still 

 be involved the error of supposing that an effect must be like its cause ; that 

 the conditions of a phenomenon are likely to resemble the phenomenon itself; 

 which we have already treated of as an d priori fallacy of the first rank. As 

 well might it be supposed that a strong poison will make the person who takes 

 it, strong. 



