FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 401 



physical fact which supposes them not so to move, oaunot be 

 authentic. This mode of reasoning, by which a bad generali 

 zation is made to overrule all facts which contradict it, is 

 petitio prindpii in one of its most palpable forms. 



None of the modes of assuming what should be proved 

 are in more frequent use than what are termed by Bentham 

 &quot; question-begging appellatives ;&quot; names which beg the ques 

 tion under the disguise of stating it. The most potent of 

 these are such as have a laudatory or vituperative character. 

 For instance, in politics, the word Innovation. The dictionary 

 meaning of this term being merely &quot; a change to something 

 new,&quot; it is difficult for the defenders even of the most salutary 

 improvement to deny that it is an innovation ; yet the word 

 having acquired in common usage a vituperative connotation 

 in addition to its dictionary meaning, the admission is always 

 construed as a large concession to the disadvantage of the 

 thing proposed. 



The following passage from the argument in refutation 

 of the Epicureans, in the second book of Cicero de Finibus, 

 affords a fine example of this sort of fallacy. &quot; Et quidem 

 illud ipsum non nimium probo (et tantum patior) philoso- 

 phum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. An potest cupiditas 

 finiri? tollenda est, atque extrahenda radicitus. Quis est 

 enim, in quo sit cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit? 

 Ergo et avarus erit, sed finite: adulter, verum habebit 

 modum : et luxuriosus eodem modo. Qualis ista philosophia 

 est, qua? non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta medio- 

 critate vitiorum ? The question was, whether certain desires, 

 when kept within bounds, are vices or not ; and the argument 

 decides the point by applying to them a word (cupiditas) 

 which implies vice. It is shown, however, in the remarks 

 which follow, that Cicero did not intend this as a serious 

 argument, but as a criticism on what he deemed an inappro 

 priate expression. &quot; Rem ipsam prorsus probo : elegantiam 

 desidero. Appellet heec desideria nature; cupiditatis nomen 

 servet alio,&quot; &c. But many persons, both ancient and 

 modern, have employed this, or something equivalent to it, as 

 a real and conclusive argument. We may remark that the 

 VOL. ii. 26 



