FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 409 



bear witness, and therefore cannot be answered by any appeal 

 to tbem. His scepticism related to tbe supposed substratum, 

 or hidden cause of the appearances perceived by our senses : 

 the evidence of which, whatever may be thought of its conclu- 

 siveness, is certainly not the evidence of sense. And it will 

 always remain a signal proof of the want of metaphysical 

 profundity of Keid, Stewart, and, I am sorry to add, of 

 Brown, that they should have persisted in asserting that 

 Berkeley, if he believed his own doctrine, was bound to walk 

 into the kennel, or run his head against a post. As if persons 

 who do not recognise an occult cause of their sensations, could 

 not possibly believe that a fixed order subsists among the 

 sensations themselves. Such a want of comprehension of the 

 distinction between a thing and its sensible manifestation, or, 

 in metaphysical language, between the noumenon and the 

 phenomenon, would be impossible to even the dullest disciple 

 of Kant or Coleridge. 



It would be easy to add a greater number of examples of 

 this fallacy, as well as of the others which I have attempted 

 to characterize. But a more copious exemplification does 

 not seem to be necessary; and the intelligent reader will 

 have little difficulty in adding to the catalogue from his own 

 reading and experience. We shall therefore here close our 

 exposition of the general principles of logic, and proceed to 

 the supplementary inquiry which is necessary to complete our 

 design. 



