480 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



from it ; and the word, therefore, in their political reasonings, 

 must be understood to mean (which is also the explanation 

 they themselves, on such occasions, gave of it) what is com 

 monly termed private, or worldly, interest. 



Taking the doctrine, then, in this sense, an objection pre 

 sents itself in limine &quot;which might be deemed a fatal one, 

 namely, that so sweeping a proposition is far from being 

 universally true. Human beings are not governed in all their 

 actions by their worldly interests. This, however, is by no 

 means so conclusive an objection as it at first appears ; because 

 in politics we are for the most part concerned with the conduct 

 not of individual persons, but either of a series of persons (as 

 a succession of kings) or a body or mass of persons, as a 

 nation, an aristocracy, or a representative assembly. And 

 whatever is true of a large majority of mankind, may without 

 much error be taken for true of any succession of persons, con 

 sidered as a whole, or of any collection of persons in which 

 the act of the majority becomes the act of the whole body, i 

 Although, therefore, the maxim is sometimes expressed in a 

 manner unnecessarily paradoxical, the consequences drawn 

 from it will hold equally good if the assertion be limited as 

 follows Any succession of persons, or the majority of any 

 body of persons, will be governed in the bulk of their conduct 

 by their personal interests. We are bound to allow to this 

 school of thinkers the benefit of this more rational statement 

 of their fundamental maxim, which is also in strict conformity 

 to the explanations which, when considered to be called for, 

 have been given by themselves. 



The theory goes on to infer, quite correctly, that if the 

 actions of mankind are determined in the main by their selfish 

 interests, the only rulers who will govern according to the 

 interest of the governed, are those whose selfish interests are 

 in accordance with it. And to this is added a third proposition, 

 namely, that no rulers have their selfish interest identical with 

 that of the governed, unless it be rendered so by accounta 

 bility, that is, by dependence on the will of the governed. In 

 other words (and as the result of the whole), that the desire of 

 retaining or the fear of losing their power, and whatever is 



