30 INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 



fabulous philosophies of which we have been speaking. 

 For though the three principles was no useless discovery, 

 but partly bordering on fact : yet, for the most part, prac 

 tised in a few experiments of distillation, they referred every 

 thing in philosophy to separation and liberation, unmindful 

 of true alteration. But the structure of that opinion, on 

 which as a foundation their philosophy rests, that there are 

 four matrices or elements in which the seeds and forms of 

 matter complete their fruits, and that these are quadriform 

 according to the different elements, so that nothing is found 

 in sky, air, water, or earth, which has not in the three re 

 maining ones something parallel and corresponding : this 

 fantastic arrangement of matter will certainly scarce have a 

 place in the dreams of the skilful observer of nature. Not 

 unlike this are the harmonies of things believed in by the 

 followers of natural magic, who explain every thing by 

 sympathy and antipathy, and, by the most idle and un 

 founded conjectures, affix to things miraculous virtues and 

 powers. Yet he treats them gently, because among so 

 many fables they have yet produced some works, though 

 commonly of that kind which are rather novel and sur 

 prising than fit for profit and utility. But even novelty has 

 often the advantage of agitating somewhat the intricate 

 folds of nature, and assisting with light at least, if not with 

 deed. So he saw that, neither in the opinions of the 

 Greeks or the moderns, nor in the traditions of alchymy or 

 natural magic, could any thing be found leading to the in 

 crease of human means. Wherefore all these should either 

 be thrown into oblivion, or given up to the pursuit of the 

 multitude, while the true sons of knowledge turn their 

 course elsewhere. 



He thought also that the modes of demonstration should 

 be reviewed ; for demonstrations, by a certain influence are 

 philosophy; and, in proportion as they are just or faulty, 

 complete or imperfect, doctrines will probably ensue from 

 them. But he found that the demonstrations which are in 

 use are neither full nor certain. Yet we should not blame 

 the senses, as some have done. For the errors of the senses 

 in particulars have no great effect on the sum of the sciences ; 

 not more at least than may be corrected by the rightly in 

 formed mind. But that the mind itself, if it rely on nature 

 without art and discipline, is unequal to the matter and 

 below it, may be pronounced boldly. For it is neither so 

 capacious as to admit and arrange the infinite variety of 

 particulars necessary for information, nor so free and un- 



