INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 31 



biassed as to receive true and natural impressions without 

 some warp and colouring. Nay, it is very certain both 

 that the human mind is generally like an uneven mirror, 

 which receives and reflects the rays of objects according to 

 the angle of each facet, and not on a plain surface ; and also 

 that every one, from his education, pursuits, and constitu 

 tion, is haunted with a kind of misleading power, and, as it 

 were, familiar spirit, which mocks and disturbs the mind 

 with various and fantastic devices. Yet we must not, 

 therefore, fall into the opinion of incapability. For it is 

 evident, that by no steadiness of hand or skill of eye, how 

 ever exquisite, could an exact straight line or circle be 

 described; yet, on applying a ruler or turning the com 

 passes, the matter is easy. Again, in mechanical crafts the 

 naked hand of man can work but little, yet with the aid and 

 means of instruments it conquers alike the vastest and most 

 minute. It follows then that we must fly to art, and must 

 look to demonstration, which is governed by art. And sen 

 tence may be given in a few words on the syllogism which 

 is Aristotle s oracle. It is, doubtless, a useful instrument 

 and aid to the understanding in sciences, which are founded 

 in human opinion, as the moral and political; but inferior and 

 incompetent to the subtlety and obscurity of natural processes. 

 For the syllogism certainly consists of propositions and the 

 proposition of words, and words are the evidences and signs 

 of ideas or conceptions of the mind. So that if the ideas 

 themselves, which are the souls of words, are vague, incom 

 plete, and not sufficiently denned (which is for the most 

 part the case in nature), the whole sinks. Induction remains 

 the last and only refuge and aid for matter; nor are our 

 hopes placed in it undeservedly, since it can collect labo 

 rious works, and the certain evidence of facts, and lay them 

 before the mind. But its name only is known, its power 

 and use has hitherto lain hid. For induction must be 

 judged of thus ; in its use and form men have erred doubly. 

 First, that impatient of delay and searching round for short 

 cuts, and hastening to fix some things as certain, round 

 which as poles discussions might turn, they have only ap 

 plied it to the general principles of sciences, lightly hoping 

 to work all within by syllogistic deduction. Secondly, that 

 having examined the syllogism accurately, but this demon 

 stration hastily and carelessly, they have devised its form 

 very simple and indeed puerile, to proceed by enumeration 

 alone, and thus conclude precariously, not necessarily. No 

 one, therefore, can wonder if he, with this opinion on de- 



