INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 41 



there is not the same danger in not trying a thing and not 

 succeeding in it; since, in the former case, the loss of a 

 great benefit, in the latter, of a little human labour is con 

 cerned. In truth, both from what has and has not been 

 said, he saw well that there was sufficient hope, not only 

 for a diligent man to make trial, but also for a prudent and 

 sober one to give credit. 



He thought also, that, when the desire is kindled, and 

 the hope formed, we must look to the means of perform 

 ance. This is then what appeared to him generally in that 

 matter; and he thought fit to enclose and embrace it in 

 naked and open sentences. 



He saw that things must be done entirely otherwise than 

 they are now; and therefore that the disproving of the 

 past is a kind of oracle for what is to come. 



He thought that theories, and opinions, and common 

 notions, as far as can be obtained from the stiffness and 

 firmness of the mind, should be entirely done away with; 

 and that the understanding should begin anew plainly 

 and fairly with particulars ; since there is no other entrance 

 open to the kingdom of nature than to the kingdom of 

 heaven, into which no one may enter except in the form of 

 a little child. 



He thought that a body and mass of particulars both 

 from their number, kind, and certainty or subtilty suffi 

 cient for information, might be collected and stored up, 

 both from natural history and mechanical experiments, 

 the latter especially because nature displays herself more 

 fully when she is held and pressed by art than at her 

 own liberty. He thought that this mass should be reduced 

 and digested into tables and regular order, that the under 

 standing may be able to act upon it and perform its office ; 

 since even the divine word did not work upon a mass of 

 things without order. 



He thought that we must not suddenly pass from the 

 particulars digested into tables, to the inquisition after 

 new particulars (which is nevertheless itself a useful thing, 

 and, like a kind of learned experience), but that we 

 should first proceed to general and large comprehensions, 

 and so far indulge the natural bent of the understandino-. 

 But at the same time he saw that the natural but vicious 

 motion and impulse of the mind to jump from particu 

 lars to high and general comprehensions (such as what 

 are called the first principles of arts and things), and to 

 get at the rest by descending through the middle ones, 



