FABLE OF CUPID. 47 



And again he says of their nature, &quot; but it is requisite the 

 elements in the work of creation should put forth a secret 

 and dark nature, lest any contrariousand opposing- principle 

 arise.&quot; Therefore atoms are neither like sparks of fire nor 

 drops of water, nor bubbles of air, nor grains of sand, nor the 

 minute particles of spirit or ether. Nor is the power and form 

 of them a something heavy or light, or hot or cold, or dense 

 or rare, or hard or soft, as are found in larger bodies, since 

 those powers and the rest of that order are compounded 

 and wrought together. And in like manner the natural 

 motion of an atom is neither that motion of descent which 

 is called natural, nor a motion opposed to that force, nor a 

 motion of expansion and contraction, nor of impulsion and 

 connexion, nor the rotatory motion of the heavenly bodies, 

 nor any other of the greater motions simply. But notwith 

 standing this, in the body of an atom are the elements of 

 all bodies, and in the nature of an atom the beginning of 

 all motions and natural properties. But yet in this very 

 point, namely, the motion of an atom as compared with the 

 motion of greater substances, the philosophy of the parable 

 appears to differ from that of Democritus. For he is not 

 only opposed to the parable, but inconsistent if not contra 

 dictory in his more copious assertions on this head. For 

 he should have ascribed an heterogeneous motion to an 

 atom not less than an heterogeneous body and power. But 

 he out of the motions of greater substances, has chosen 

 two, to ascribe them as primitive motions to atoms, namely, 

 the descent of heavy and the ascent of light bodies, 

 (which he explained by the striking or the percussion of 

 the more heavy, in forcing upwards the less heavy, bo 

 dies). But the parable all along preserves the hetero 

 geneous, and exclusive nature it ascribes to atoms, as well 

 in speaking of its motion as of its substance. But the 

 parable further intimates that this exclusion has its limit, 

 for night does not brood over the egg for ever : and it is 

 certainly proper to the Deity, that in our inquiry into his 

 nature by means of the senses exclusions should not ter 

 minate in affirmatives. And there is another reason for 

 this, namely, that after the due exclusions and negations 

 something should be affirmed and settled, and that the egg 

 should be produced as it were by a seasonable and mature 

 incubation ; not only that the egg should be brought forth 

 by night, but also that the person of Cupid should be de 

 livered of the egg : that is, that not only should an obscure 

 notion upon this subject be originated, but one that is 

 distinct. Thus much upon demonstrations, as far as they 



