50 FABLE OF CUPID. 



ought no less to possess a real existence than those which 

 flow from it; rather more. For it has its own peculiar 

 essence, and from it come all the rest. But the assertions 

 that have been made respecting abstract matter are as 

 absurd as it would be to say that the universe and nature 

 were made out of categories and such dialectic notions, as 

 out of elements. For the difference is by no means im 

 portant between asserting that the world sprang from mat 

 ter and form and privation, and asserting that it arose out 

 of substance and the contrary qualities. But almost all 

 the ancients, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Hera- 

 clitus, Democritus, though disagreeing m other respects^ 

 upon the prime matter, joined in this, that they held an 

 active matter with a form, both arranging its own form and 

 ha vino- within itself the principle of motion. Nor can any 

 one think otherwise without leaving experience altogether. 

 All these then submitted their mind to nature. But Plato 

 subjected the world to his contemplations, and Aristotle his 

 contemplations to terms : for the studies of men were at 

 that time verging toward logomachies and disputations, 

 and leaving the severer investigation of truth. Wherefore 

 doo-mas of this nature are rather to be condemned in the 

 ma & ss than refuted in detail. For they come not from a 

 desire of knowledge, but of much speaking: and that 

 abstract matter is not the matter of the universe, but matter 

 for disputation. For a true philosopher will dissect not 

 sever nature (for they who will not dissect, must pull her 

 asunder), and the prime matter is to be laid down joined 

 with the primitive form, as also with the first principle of 

 motion, as it is found. For the abstraction of motion has 

 also o-iven rise to innumerable devices concerning spirits, 

 life, and the like, as if there were not laid a sufficient 

 ground for them through matter and form, but they de 

 pended on their own peculiar elements. But these three 

 are not to be separated, but only distinguished, and matter 

 is to be so treated (whatever it be) in regard of its adorn 

 ment, appendages, and form, as that all kind of influence, 

 essence, action, and natural motion may appear to be its 

 emanation and consequence. Nor need we fear that from 

 this that inquiry should stagnate, or that variety which we 

 perceive should become incapable of explanation, as will 

 be shown hereafter. And that the first matter is pos 

 sessed of form the parable teaches in making Cupid a 

 definite person. Yet so that matter in the mass was at 

 first without form : for chaos is without form, Cupid is a 



