FABLE OF CUPID. 57 



but as to every other circumstance more difficult and ab 

 struse. But predicaments did not rule then, so as that 

 this element of abstract nature might lie hid under the 

 protecting tutelage of the predicament of the substance. 

 No one dared therefore to feign a kind of matter entirely 

 phantastic, but decided upon a principle according to per 

 ception, a certain true ens; but yet (proceeding in this 

 respect too far) the mode of its distribution phantastic. 

 For they find nothing, nay, they do not feign any thing by 

 which, by an appetite or incitement, or in any way, me 

 thod, or guidance, this their element may degenerate from 

 itself and again return to itself. But when throughout 

 the universe there appears so great an army of contrary 

 powers, density, rarity, heat, cold, light, darkness, anima 

 tion, inanimation, and of many others which contend with 

 each other and fall into privation or nothingness, to sup 

 pose that all these flow from one and the same fount of a 

 material nature, and yet not to point out any way in which 

 this can take place, is the part of a mind overcome by dis 

 traction, and seems a departure from the spirit of true 

 inquiry. For if the thing were clearly made out by sense 

 it were to be borne with, though the mode of it were 

 involved in obscurity ; again, if by the strength of reason 

 any suitable and credible mode could be searched out, one 

 might learn perhaps from appearances; but our assent is 

 by no means to be demanded to the existence of entities, 

 neither evident to the senses nor admitting of any probable 

 elucidation from reason. Besides, if there were but one 

 element of things, there ought to be seen in all things 

 some signs of it, and certain more excellent parts, and a 

 certain preeminent quality in their nature. It ought 

 moreover to be in open sight, that it might the more easily 

 be accessible to all things, and might diffuse itself through 

 out its orbit. But none of these things can be made out 

 from their dogmas. For the earth, which is cut off from 

 the honour of being deemed an element, appears to receive 

 and cherish natures opposite to these three principal, see 

 ing that to the mobility and lucid nature of fire it opposes 

 the natures of rest and darkness; to the tenuity and soft 

 ness of^air, in like manner, the natures of density and 

 hardness ; and to the humidity and yieldingness of water, 

 a nature dry, stubborn, and rough, and the earth occupies 

 a middle rank, the rest being denied this claim. Moreover 

 if it were the only principle of things, it ought to have 

 a natural fitness equal to both the generation and dissolu 

 tion of things. For it as much belongs to the nature of an 



