INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 103 



less you incribe something else, you cannot erase what has 

 before been written. And although this may be done, 

 although thou mayest put off the idols of friendship, yet 

 indeed, being uninitiated, there is danger that thou mayest 

 be overwhelmed by the idols of the way. Thou hast too 

 much accustomed thyself to a leader. At Rome, tyranny 

 being once established, the oath in the name of the Roman 

 senate and people was ever afterwards vain. Confide and 

 give thyself to me, my son, that I may restore thee to 

 thyself. 



OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 



ACCOUNTING myself born for the use of mankind, and 

 judging the case of the commonweal to be one of those 

 things which are of public right, and like water or air lie 

 open to all; I sought what might be of most advantage to 

 men, and deliberated what I was most fitted for by nature. 

 I discovered that nothing is of such estimation towards the 

 human race, as the invention and earnest of new things 

 and arts, by which man s life is adorned. For I perceive 

 that, even in old times among rude men, the inventors and 

 teachers of things rude were consecrated and chosen into 

 the number of the gods; and I noted that the deeds of 

 heroes who built cities, or were legislators, or exercised 

 just authority, or subdued unjust dominations, were cir 

 cumscribed by the narrowness of places and times. But 

 the invention of things, though it be a matter of less pomp, 

 I esteemed more adapted for universality and eternity. 

 Yet above all, if any bring forth no particular invention, 

 though of much utility, but kindleth a light in nature, 

 which from the very beginning illuminates the regions of 

 things, which lie contiguous to things already invented, 

 afterwards being elevated lays open and brings to view all 

 the abstrusest things ; he seems to me a propagator of the 

 empire of man over the universe, a defender of liberty, a 

 conqueror of necessities. But I found myself constructed 

 more for the contemplations of truth than for aught else, 

 as having a mind sufficiently mobile for recognizing (what 

 is most of all) the similitude of things, and sufficiently 

 fixed and intent for observing the subtleties of differences, 

 and possessing love of investigation, patience in doubting, 

 pleasure in meditating, delay in asserting, facility in return 

 ing to wisdom, and neither affecting novelty, nor admiring 

 antiquity, and hating all imposture. Wherefore I judged 

 my nature to have a kind of familiarity and relationship 



