INTELLECTUAL GLOBE. 151 



loose from the bondage of things, and breaks forth illimita- 

 bly, and creates at will. And any one may easily compre 

 hend that this is so, who shall seek the source of things 

 intellectual even on the simplest principles, and with the 

 most crass apprehension. For the images of things indi 

 vidual are admitted into the sense and fixed in the memory. 

 They pass into the memory as it were whole, in the same 

 manner as they present themselves. These the mind recals 

 and retraces ; and, which is its proper business, puts toge 

 ther and decomposes their parts. Now individuals seve 

 rally have something in common one with another, and 

 again something diverse and complex. Composition and 

 division takes place either at the will of the mind itself, or 

 agreeably to what is found in nature. If it is done at the 

 mere volition of the mind, and such parts of things are 

 arbitrarily applied, so as to form a certain likeness of some 

 individual, it is the work of imagination; which, restrained 

 by no law or necessity of nature or of matter, can unite 

 things which in nature are most discordant, and divide 

 those which never exist in separation, so as however this 

 is still confined to such original parts of the individuals. 

 For there is no imagination, not even a dream, of objects 

 which have not in some shape presented themselves to the 

 senses. Again, if the same sections of objects be joined or 

 divided according to the real evidence of things, and as 

 they actually present themselves in nature, or at least as 

 they are observed to present themselves according to the 

 general apprehension of mankind, this is the office of 

 reason; and all such adjustment is ascribed to reason. 



Whence it clearly appears that from these three sources 

 there arise the three several streams of history, poesy, 

 and philosophy, and that there cannot be other or more 

 branches than these. For under the name of philosophy 

 we comprehend all the arts and sciences, and whatever in 

 short can, from the presentment of the several objects of 

 nature, be by the mind collected and arranged into general 

 notions. Nor do we think that there is occasion, in consi 

 deration of the extent of the subject, for any other division 

 of learning than that which we have stated above. For 

 though the responses of a divine oracle and of the senses 

 are different, no .doubt, both in the matter and the mode by 

 which it finds access to the mind ; yet the spirit of man 

 which receives both is one and the same, just as different 

 liquors passing through different apertures are received 

 into one and the same vessel. Wherefore we assert that 



