NOTE 4 B. 



drew that answer from the greatest and worthiest Roman of his time, Paulus 

 Emilius, being demanded why lie would put away his wife for no visible reason ! 

 * This shoe, said he, and held it out on his foot, is a neat shoe, a new shoe, 

 and yet none of you know where it wrings me ;&quot; much less by the unfamiliar 

 cognizance of a feed gamester can such a private difference be examined, neither 

 ought it. 



The following extract is from Boswell s Life of Johnson, vol. ii. p. 162. I 

 asked him whether, as a moralist, he did not think that the practice of the law, 

 in some degree, hurt the fine feeling of honesty. Johnson. &quot; Why no, Sir, if 

 you act properly. You are not to deceive your clients with false representations 

 of your opinion : you are not to tell lies to a judge.&quot; Boswell. &quot; But what do 

 you think of supporting a cause which you know to be bad.&quot; Johnson. &quot; Sir, 

 you do not know it to be good or bad till the judge determines it. 1 have said 

 that you are to state facts fairly ; so that your thinking, or what you call know 

 ing, a cause to be bad, must be from reasoning, must be from your supposing 

 your arguments to be weak and inconclusive. But, Sir, that is not enough. An 

 argument which does not convince yourself, may convince the judge to whom 

 you urge it; and, if it does convince him, why, then, Sir, you are wrong, and 

 he is right. It is his business to judge ; and, you are not to be confident in your 

 opinion that a cause is bad, but to say all you can for your client, and then hear 

 the judge s opinion.&quot; Boswell. &quot; But, Sir, does not affecting a warmth when 

 you have no warmth, and appearing to be clearly of one opinion, when you are 

 in reality of another opinion, does not such dissimulation impair one s honesty? 

 Is there not some danger that a lawyer may put on the same mask in common 

 life, in the intercourse with his friends!&quot; Johnson. &quot;Why no, Sir. Every 

 body knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your client ; and it is, there 

 fore, properly no dissimulation : the moment you come from the bar you resume 

 your usual behaviour. Sir, a man will no more carry the artifice of the bar into 

 the common intercourse of society, than a man who is paid for tumbling upon 

 his hands will continue to tumble upon his hands when he should walk on his 

 feet.&quot; 



Lord Erskine, in his defence of Thomas Paine, says, I will for ever, at all 

 hazards, assert the dignity, independence, and integrity of the English bar ; 

 without which impartial justice, the most valuable part of the English constitu 

 tion, can have no existence. From the moment that any advocate can be per 

 mitted to say that he will or will not stand between the crown and the subject 

 arraigned in the court where he daily sits to practise, from that moment the 

 liberties of England are at an end. 



If the advocate refuses to defend, from what he may think of the charge or of 

 the defence, he assumes the character of the judge ; nay, he assumes it before 

 the hour of judgment; and, in proportion to his rank and reputation, puts the 

 heavy influence of, perhaps, a mistaken opinion, into the scale against the ac 

 cused, in whose favour the benevolent principle of English law makes all pre 

 sumptions, and which commands the very judge to be his counsel. 



The following extract is from the life of Sir M. Hale, 143. If he saw a cause 

 was unjust, he for a great while would not meddle further in it, but to give his 

 advice that it was so. If the parties after that would go on, they were to seek 

 another counsellor, for he would assist none in acts of injustice. If he found 

 the cause doubtful or weak in point of law, he always advised his clients to 

 agree their business. Yet afterwards he abated much of the scrupulosity he had 

 about causes that appeared at first view unjust, upon this occasion. There were 

 two causes brought to him, which by the ignorance of the party, or their attor 

 ney, were so ill represented to him, that they seemed to be very bad, but he, in 

 quiring more narrowly into them, found they were really very good and just. 

 So after this he slackened much of his former strictness, of refusing to meddle in 

 causes upon the ill circumstances that appeared in them at first. 



The administration of justice mainly depends upon the ability and the inte 

 grity of the bar. Who, in times when our liberties are threatened, when power 

 is attempting to extend its influence ; who but men of ability can be expected to 

 resist these invasions ? Is it to be expected that the herd who follow any body 



VOL. xv. 



