DISCOURSE ON METHOD. 19 



when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; 

 in like manner, instead of the great number of pre 

 cepts of which Logic is composed, I believed that 

 the four following would prove perfectly sufficient 

 for me, provided I took the firm and unwavering 

 resolution never in a single instance to fail in 

 observing them. 



The first was never to accept anything for true 

 which I did not clearly know to be snch ; that is to 

 say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, 

 and to comprise nothing more in my judgment 

 than what was presented to my mind so clearly and 

 distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. 



The seco-ntf, to divide each of the difficulties under 

 examination into as many parts as possible, and as 

 might be necessary for its adequate solution. 



The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order 

 that, by commencing with objects the simplest and 

 easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, 

 and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of 

 the more complex; assigning in thought a certain 

 order even to those objects which in their own 

 nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and 

 sequence. 



And the last, in every case to make enumerations 

 so complete, and reviews so general, that I might 



be assured that nothing was omitted. &amp;lt;2xctP&amp;lt;r VW *^s 



& .4^1.44. 



The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by . -i 



means of which geometers are accustomed to reach uV 

 the conclusions of their most difficult demonstra- , ^ \}o\\& h 

 tions, had led me to imagine that all things, to the . A 

 knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually 



