DISCOURSE ON METHOD. 25 



tion, I was convinced that I could not do better 

 than follow in the meantime the opinions of the 

 most judicious; and although there are some per 

 haps among the Persians and Chinese as judicious* 

 as among ourselves, expediency seemed to dictate 

 that I should regulate my practice conformably to 

 the opinions of those with whom I should have to 

 live ; and it appeared to me that, in order to ascer 

 tain the real opinions of such, I ought rather to take 

 cognizance of what they practised than of what they 

 said, not only because, in the corruption of our 

 manners, there are few disposed to speak exactly as 

 they believe, but also because very many are not 

 aware of what it is that they really believe; for, 

 as the act of mind by which a thing is believed is 

 different from that by which we know that we 

 believe it, the one act is often found without the 

 other. Also, amid many opinions held in equal 

 repute, I chose always the most moderate, as much 

 for the reason that these are always the most con 

 venient for practice, and probably the best, (for_aH 

 excess is generally vicious,) as that, in the event of 

 my~falling into error, I might be at less distance 

 from the truth than if, having chosen one of the 

 extremes, it should turn out to be the other which I 

 ought to have adopted. And I placed in the class 

 of extremes especially all promises by which some- 

 what of our freedom is abridged ; not that I disap 

 proved of the laws which, to provide against the 

 instability of men of feeble resolution, when what is 

 sought to be accomplished is some good, permit 

 engagements by vows and contracts binding the 



