36 DESCARTES 



consists only in thinking-, and which, that it may 

 exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any 

 material thing; so that &quot;I,&quot; that is to say, .the jpincl 

 by which I am what, Lam. is_ wholly ^distinct frgm 

 me body, and is even more easily known than the 

 latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, 

 it would still continue to be all that it is. 



After this I inquired in general into what is essen 

 tial to the truth and certainty of a proposition ; for 

 since I had discovered one which I knew to be true, 

 I thought that I must likewise be able to discover 

 the ground of this certiiude. And as I observed 

 that in the words / think, hence I am, there is noth 

 ing at all which gives me assurance of their truth 

 beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to 

 think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I 

 might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all 

 the things which we very clearly and distinctly con 

 ceive are true, only observing, however, that there is 

 some difficulty in rightly determining the objects 

 which we distinctly conceive. 



In the next place, from reflecting on the circum 

 stance that I doubted, and that consequently my 

 being was not wholly perfect, (for I clearly saw that 

 it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt,) 

 I was led to inquire whence I had learned to think 

 of something more perfect than myself; and I 

 clearly recognised that I must hold this notion from 

 some Nature which in reality was more perfect. As 

 for the thoughts of many other objects external to 

 me, as of the sky, the earth, light, heat, and a thou 

 sand more, I was less at a loss to know whence these 



