DISCOURSE ON METHOD. 37 



came ; for since I remarked in them nothing which 

 seemed to render them superior to myself, I could 

 believe that, if these were true, they were depend 

 encies on my own nature, in so far as it possessed a 

 certain perfection, and, if they were false, that I 

 held them from nothing, that is to say, that they 

 were in me because of a certain imperfection of my 

 nature. But this could not be the case with the idea 

 of a Nature more perfect than myself; for to receive 

 it from nothing was a thing manifestly impossible ; 

 and, because it is not less repugnant that the more 

 perfect should be an effect of, and dependence on 

 the less perfect, than that something should proceed 

 from nothing, it was equally impossible that I could 

 hold it from myself: accordingly, it but remained 

 that it had been placed in me by a Nature which 

 was in reality more perfect than mine, and which 

 even possessed within itself all the perfections of 

 which I could form any idea; that is to say, in a 

 single word, which was God. And to this I added 

 that, since I knew some perfections which I did not 

 possess, I was not the only being in existence, 

 (I will here, with your permission, freely use the 

 terms of the schools) ; but, on the contrary, that 

 there was of necessity some other more perfect 

 Being upon whom I was dependent, and from whom 

 I had received all that I possessed; for if I had 

 existed alone, and independently of every other 

 being, so as to have had from myself all the perfec 

 t-ion, however little, which I actually possessed, I 

 should have been able, for the same reason, to have 

 had from myself the whole remainder of perfection, 



