H DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



of nature, in themselves considered, but a property of our imagi 

 nations projected forth upon them. 



Such were the two great types of philosophical thought which 

 prevailed among the leading minds of Europe for five generations. 

 We are aware how scanty has been our exposition, and how much 

 that is of first class importance has been passed over. And yet, 

 could we have contrived it, we should have cut the account still 

 shorter. For our object has been simply to present the main 

 lines of cleavage with all the distinctness of a glaring contrast. 

 As we conceive it, the difference is essentially one between two 

 scientific ideals, gained from the two sciences which were in most 

 active progress at that time. Well-known parallels of greater 

 or less suggestiveness are to be found in the influence of the 

 science of mechanics upon Kant, of the history of civilization 

 upon Hegel, of biology upon the ethical speculation of the half- 

 century since the Origin of Species, and of comparative and social 

 psychology upon many thinkers of today. 



In this connection it is interesting to note that of the greater 

 English empiricists not one was a mathematician. Berkeley, 

 indeed, had a more than ordinarily good training in mathematics, 

 and showed a very keen interest in such studies. His earliest 

 published writings were upon mathematical subjects. But his 

 greatness lay elsewhere. Hutcheson, more than any other of 

 the school, was influenced in his thought by mathematical con 

 ceptions sometimes in a very grotesque fashion. But this was 

 only in the details of his system ; its general structure was wholly 

 psychological. Equally interesting is the impermeability of Leib 

 niz to the influences of the new psychology. For Leibniz, among 

 all philosophers, ancient and modern, is conspicuous both for the 

 breadth of his sympathies and the clearness of his critical insight; 

 and his literary life overlapped not only Locke s but Berkeley s. 

 Locke, indeed, he understood except where a spirit of prophecy 

 was necessary to understand him; but in Berkeley s epoch-mak 

 ing work he could see nothing at all. And in his own psychology 



