THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY OF IDEAS 6 1 



while accepting the necessity for an external cause for the idea 

 (where it is not the work of the mind itself), he denies that there 

 must be a distinct cause for each idea ; and he urges the observ 

 able uniformity in the succession of ideas as proof that they have 

 a common origin. The difficulty which then faces him is that of 

 explaining, or explaining away, the universal assumption of 

 science and common-sense, that things exist while we are not 

 observing or thinking of them. This he declares is true as the 

 condensed statement of the results of conditions contrary to fact. 

 It really means only that if conditions were otherwise the things 

 would be perceived. Stated categorically, it means simply that 

 the order in which sensations come to us contains numerous 

 uniformities; that these uniformities are not limited to the ex 

 periences of single minds, but extend from mind to mind in such 

 fashion that the experiences of different men dovetail into each 

 other; and that the uniformities of sensation are more or less 

 reproduced in imagination. We have, for example, often seen 

 wood consumed to ashes; and now, seeing similar ashes, we im 

 agine a fire that has burnt here in our absence, a fire which an 

 observer would have seen, had one been present. There is no 

 reason to assume the existence of a thing in addition to the 

 image or percept; nor is there any sense in supposing that an 

 idea exists elsewhere than in some consciousness. 



Hume s attitude upon the matter is well expressed in a famous 

 footnote in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. 1 

 Berkeley s arguments, he says, are absolutely irrefutable and 

 utterly unconvincing. For the representative theory Hume has 

 no manner of use. It simply doubles the problems to be solved, 

 without lending any aid toward their solution. And Hume am 

 plifies Berkeley s argument against it in one very important 

 direction. Berkeley had shown that ideas could resemble nothing 

 except other ideas. Hume, upon the basis of his theory of neces 

 sary connection, shows that ideas can be related as effects to 

 nothing except other ideas. The last vestige of support for the 



lection XII, Part I. 



