84 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



But we cannot discuss Kant s regulative principles without 

 reference to their function in the moral life. Indeed, it is in the 

 fact of their common functioning in the world of conduct and 

 in the world of thought that the contemporary pragmatist is 

 wont to feel his closest kinship with criticism. In the realm of 

 speculative reason, the ideas of God, the world, and the soul 

 remain mere empty conceptions. Their objects lie beyond the 

 reach of thought. Their only sanction lies in the constant im 

 pulse of thought to go beyond its boundaries. If this were all 

 that could be said on their behalf, the position of the regulative 

 ideas would be precarious indeed. But to consider only their 

 function in theoretical knowledge is to leave out of account the 

 most important part which they play in the life of man. For if 

 theoretically they have no validity, practically they are neces 

 sary. Although their objects must remain altogether unknow 

 able by speculative thought, in the moral life is found indubitable 

 assurance of their reality. They are the postulates of practical 

 reason, the necessary conditions for the possibility of moral con 

 duct. Now this conception of the ideas of reason, as obtaining 

 their ultifnate sanction in the sphere of. conduct, would seem to 

 accord to practical reason a certain supremacy over speculative 

 thought. It is in the practical life that the final solution is 

 found of problems which prove insoluble for thought. In so 

 far as this is true, the Kantian conception of regulative ideas 

 doubtless does exhibit a leaning toward such a voluntarism as is 

 often associated with pragmatism. Furthermore a certain simi 

 larity to the pragmatist theory is to be found in the very fact 

 that the regulative principles serve to unite conduct with specu 

 lative thought. But here again we find that the resemblance 

 to pragmatism is far less than appears at first sight, and that 

 the half-acceptance of an instrumentalist position serves to em 

 phasize the critical adherence to dogmatic absolutism. 



In the first place, let us note that the validity which the moral 

 consciousness furnishes to the ideas of reason does not in the 

 least affect their function for thought ; they are valid for practical 



