ABSOLUTE IDEALISM TO/ 



with rationalism upon the question of the existence of a body of 

 absolutely clear and distinct thoughts, given by intuition and 

 insusceptible of any modification. But the law of contradiction 

 has nothing to do with the possibility of unclear thought or 

 with the question whether certain categories are clear or unclear. 

 Nor is it involved in the question, whether the thinking of unclear, 

 self-contradictory thoughts is a necessary precondition of the 

 thinking of self-consistent and adequate thoughts. But that self- 

 contradiction is an infallible sign of unclearness and untruth 

 both Hegel and the rationalists agree. 



In the second place and here he is more seriously guilty 

 Hegel systematically confounds opposition of any sort, either in 

 nature or in society, with the existence of a logical contradiction ; 

 just as he also identifies the mutual cancellation of opposed ele 

 ments with the process of dialectic. Contradiction, he accord 

 ingly declares, has a universal phenomenal existence. An example 

 may serve to make clear his view. The acid and the base are 

 opposites. Yet each is directly dependent upon the other for its 

 specific characteristics. If there were not acids, a base would 

 not be a base. Either, then, by itself considered, is an unreal 

 abstraction, and it is only in their combination that their truth 

 is realized. Their existence together in the world is thus an 

 open contradiction hence their tendency to react. This, of course, 

 is puerile; and such stuff bulks larger in Hegel s work than one 

 would like to admit. But even here, let it be noted, the contra 

 diction is only phenomenal, not actual. It exists at all times, but 

 only in each temporal cross-section. In the continuous flow of 

 the cosmic process, it is perfectly resolved. 



In the third place, there are the numerous express self-contra 

 dictions which are to be found in all his writings. But can such 

 outrages upon language be avoided by any man who attempts to 

 work out an evolutionary philosophy? The prepositional form, 

 Hegel insists, is incapable of expressing speculative truth, that 

 is to say, of expressing the relation between concepts which are 

 in process of development. No proposition which attempts the 



