EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 139 



ness interferes, and that when a readjustment is accomplished 

 it retires, has real significance only for the most rudimentary 

 conscious processes. As applied to more complex processes, it is 

 a mere tautology; for, in that case, adjustment and failure of 

 adjustment no longer refer to the conditions of survival, but to 

 the expression of volitional tendencies whose relation to survival 

 is practically undetermined. 



A further advantage to pragmatism is contained in the fact 

 that it now becomes feasible to include thought-activities as such 

 under the term behavior or conduct. So long as conduct was 

 conceived to be essentially determined by its relation to survival, 

 such inclusion was not practicable; since it is not clear how in 

 general a conscious process as such, or the neural process corre 

 lated therewith, is capable of modifying the situation of an organ 

 ism in such a way as to improve its chances of survival. A mere 

 thought cannot ward off a blow or repair expended energies. 

 And so, if a thought was to be regarded as conduct, it was neces 

 sarily in a modified and secondary sense, namely as a contribut 

 ing cause to conduct proper, i. e., directed physical movements. 

 Mental procedure must then be interpreted as a succession of 

 attitudes, of preparations for action like the crouch of the cat 

 making ready to spring. Unfortunately, scientific procedure has 

 commonly no conscious reference to overt action; and when its 

 significance for the guidance of such action is made clear, the 

 relation is not to any particular situation or any particular re 

 sponse. But when conduct is defined in relation to a state of 

 consciousness, such as satisfaction, the difficulty no longer re 

 mains. It is only necessary that a specific interest be taken in 

 the issue of the thought-activity as such the solution of a mathe 

 matical problem, for example apart from any expected effect 

 upon later physical movements; and this is so far from being 

 inconceivable, that it is a familiar daily experience. 



But is it correct to say that happiness, as such, is the deter 

 minant of intellectual progress and the ultimate term to which the 



