EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES H5 



this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. 

 . . . Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground 

 of his temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There 

 arises thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: 

 the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned&quot; (pp. 7 ff.). 

 This account appears to be an understatement, or a misstate- 

 ment, of the facts in several important respects. 



1. It is not simply the professional philosopher, but the scien 

 tist of every shade, that attempts to eliminate, as far as possible, 

 the temperamental factor from his results. Mathematician, 

 physicist, biologist, sociologist if this is a conspiracy, they are 

 all in it. 



2. The restriction is not due to professionalism. If it be a 

 piece of scientific tradition, at any rate it does not belong to the 

 bureaucracy of science. The free lance is as much bound by it 

 as the member of six academies. 



3. The restriction does not apply simply to temperament, but to 

 every other peculiarity that can affect the general verifiability of 

 the results. This does not mean that a perfect elimination of 

 the individual factor is possible. But it means that no effort is 

 spared to carry the elimination as far as possible. The personal 

 equation/ by which astronomical observations are corrected, is 

 typical of such effort. Even a claim to exclusive sources of 

 information, except as it may be substantiated by rigid cross- 

 questioning, is of little avail to the man of science, though appro 

 priate enough in the prophet. When an unconfirmed observation 

 is accepted as correct, it is only on the basis of a critical examina 

 tion of the general scientific record of the observer; and even 

 then it is usually regarded with some degree of suspicion. A 

 claim to peculiar faculties of intelligence such as the aesthetic 

 world-view of the German romanticists may inspire enthusiasm 

 in a religious or philosophical sect, but the progress of science 

 invariably discredits it. 



4. That the philosopher or the scientist trusts his tempera 

 ment, is ambiguous and only half true. He distrusts it in general, 



ii 



