1 66 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



past. Nevertheless the failure to discriminate and describe the 

 various ways in which the different types of cognitive experience 

 function in the control of conduct, has certainly become a serious 

 defect in their general theory. It would seem, for example, a 

 matter of considerable importance to the successful development 

 of pragmatism, that some systematic account should be given of 

 the distinctive character of general ideas on the one hand, and 

 of particular ideas on the other hand, together with their genetic 

 relationship; or, again, that a similar account be given of the 

 genetic relationship of the perception of objects to simple sense- 

 experience. Yet, so far as we are aware, no such account has 

 been attempted. Thus, according to Professor James s Pragma 

 tism, the meaning of any idea consists in the particular differences 

 in conduct which it involves. Any difference in meaning between 

 one idea and another, accordingly, is wholly resolvable into the 

 difference between the cash-values&quot; of the two ideas. Professor 

 James s treatment is of course intended to be merely general; 

 and yet not only does it take no account of any possible specific 

 differences between different kinds of ideas, but it is hard to see 

 how any difference of kind could be made out on the terms 

 provided. 



A treatment of the nature of meaning would seem to demand 

 the consideration of two problems of primary importance: first, 

 the distinctive characteristics x)f the concept of an object, both on 

 the side of content and on that of import; and, second, the dis 

 tinctive characteristics of the general concept. The first of these 

 problems is indeed touched upon by Professor James. In the 

 passage already quoted, in which he sums up the &quot;principle of 

 Peirce,&quot; he writes: &quot;To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts 

 of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects 

 of a practical kind the object may involve what sensations 

 we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. 

 Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, 

 is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as 

 that conception has positive significance at all&quot; (pp. 46-47). 



