17 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



hand, the distinctions thus constitutive of the content are correla 

 tive with the second aspect of the content namely, the recog 

 nized identity of the object with itself in different situations. In 

 the earlier form of cognitive experience, the identity of the 

 stimulus is a simple given identity of sense-qualities within which 

 no differences subsist. But the identity of the object is the identity 

 of a system. It is constituted by the whole group of possible 

 sense-impressions, associated with the conditions of their appear 

 ance. Thus, for example, a single sense-impression may not be 

 sufficient to establish the identity of the thing perceived. The 

 given impression may be precisely that which the supposed object 

 would yield under the given conditions; but it cannot be truly 

 identified as the object, unless under changed conditions it con 

 tinues to yield such impressions as are to be expected from that 

 object upon similar changes. 



We are now ready to call attention to a further distinction. 

 The group of associations which constitutes the concept may 

 never in its entirety be present to consciousness in any single 

 experience. In fact, it is only a concept of very low type that 

 w^ould ever be wholly present. The concept is not to be identified 

 with any conscious process, however complex. It is an organi 

 zation of possible processes, which is represented in consciousness 

 by some member or members of the system or by some symbol 

 associated therewith. Such representative processes are of two 

 kinds: percepts and ideas. The system itself is the object-as- 

 conceived, to which the representative process refers, and to 

 \vhich it must conform if it is satisfactorily to perform its cognitive 

 function. 1 Or, again, in another sense of the term, the system 

 is the meaning of the representative percept or idea. 



How, to take first the case of perception, the representation 

 of the system is psychologically accomplished by the actual per 

 ceptive process, is a problem w r hich has not been fully solved. 



1 Of course, conformity to the object-as-conceived is not sufficient to ensure 

 successful conduct. For the object may not be adequately conceived. It may be 

 that future experiences, in revealing hitherto unknown possibilities of the object 

 will demand a modification of the conceptual system. 



