THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS I? I 



How, indeed, can given conscious contents represent or mean 

 or point to other possible contents not given? Where the habit 

 ual associations which make up the concept are very few and 

 simple, representation may, perhaps, be effected by the revival 

 of images of the associated experiences; but where the associa 

 tions of the given sense-presentation are numerous and complex, 

 the percept certainly does not contain the revived images of all 

 the possible associated experiences. Yet some structural peculi 

 arity of the given content is, no doubt, to be looked for, to account 

 for the representative function. When the perception involves 

 an appreciable degree of attention which is, of course, the 

 favorable condition for revival there would undoubtedly be a 

 successful tendency in certain of the associated .experiences to 

 rise to clear consciousness, while a weaker tendency on the part 

 of others would be inhibited. We would suggest, however, that 

 such inhibited tendencies to revival may affect in a distinctive 

 manner the qualitative tone of the existing content. The arousal 

 of attention regularly goes along with some uncertainty ; it means 

 the problematic character of the presentation attended to. And 

 this problematic character may well involve a conflict among the 

 various associations. There develops, it is true, a capacity for 

 perception without any appreciable degree of attention. Thus 

 the familiar objects of daily life are given presentations, from 

 which all meaning, all conscious reference, seems to have worn 

 away. 1 Nevertheless, it would, we believe, be committing a 

 serious mistake to regard such perceptual experiences as merely 

 given presentations wholly devoid of reference. Far better does 

 it seem to regard their meaning or reference as potential, repre 

 sented by nascent tendencies of association w r ith a whole group 



J It is this characteristic type of experience which the pragmatist is so concerned 

 to distinguish from the knowing, or cognitive, experience proper. It is just 

 t he failure to make this distinction, so Professor Dewey claims, and the attempt to 

 treat all experience as exclusively cognitive, that is the source of the futile intellec- 

 tualism of present-day philosophy. With this contention we feel a certain sym 

 pathy. But we believe that the differences between the knowing experience and 

 other forms of experience have been greatly exaggerated, and that a serious limita 

 tion has thus been put upon the development of pragmatist theory. 



