MILL S THEORY OF OBJECTIVITY 



position, etc. The perceived object, that is to say, is determined 

 to a greater extent by the associations which the given sensations 

 have with other merely possible sensations, than it is by the 

 actually given sensations themselves. And, in fact, the existing 

 sensations enter into the perception of the given object, not 

 through the mere fact of their actual presence in consciousness, 

 but by reason of their association with the whole group of possible 

 sensations which make up the object. 



But directly perceived objects form but a small part, again, of 

 the world of objects which we believe at any moment to exist, 

 and which we constantly think of as existing the world which 

 forms the persistent background of our immediately given exper 

 iences. If we analyze what we mean by the existence of an 

 object not actually perceived, a precisely similar result is reached, 

 namely, that it is nothing more than a group of possibilities of 

 sensation under specific conditions. Indeed, whether the object 

 is perceived or not, it is this group of definitely connected pos 

 sibilities of sensation that constitutes its objectivity as over against 

 the subjectivity of the transient and variable actual sensations. 

 It is true that there \vould be no group of possible sensations 

 no object would exist if it were not for the actual experiences 

 of the past and of the present; and yet, it is the possibilities that 

 are relatively permanent and unchanging, while the actual sensa 

 tions are fleeting and changeable. 



Mill s theory is thus seen to make a great advance over that 

 of Berkeley, in that the object is no longer itself a kind of idea- 

 It is not, in other words, a state of consciousness. In relation 

 to such states, the existence of the object may be described 

 as ideal. But Mill is still a Berkeleyan in that the object is ex 

 plained in terms of ideas, or, strictly speaking, of sensations. Its 

 existence as something independent of conscious minds is as 

 meaningless to him as it was to Berkeley. Moreover, the object, 

 as compared with the elements of consciousness, is merely deriv- 

 tive; it is, in a sense, an artificial product. The fact that it is 

 regarded by common sense as possessing a reality superior to 

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