CHAPTER IV 



THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS 

 II. THE GENERAL CONCEPT 



So far we have not concerned ourselves directly with that 

 level of cognitive experience at which the concept of the simple 

 object has been differentiated into the universal concept, denoting 

 any member of a class, and the individual concept, denoting a 

 particular member of the class; although in what has preceded 

 we have had occasion to refer to such a type of experience. The 

 earliest objects, like the earliest sense-images, are, of couise, 

 neither universal nor particular, but possess certain character 

 istics of both types. The fully developed universal is no doubt 

 a product of a very late stage of development, as is also the fully 

 developed individual. In advance, however, of a complete dif 

 ferentiation of the two, objects must have fallen into groups, more 

 or less indeterminate, to be sure, but within which quasi-logical 

 relations became established which bore certain analogies to the 

 later logical relation between class and individual member. 



This may be illustrated by the behavior of young children. 

 Very early there appears an instinctive recognition of other 

 children. The sight of another child elicits signs of interest and 

 delight, which the appearance of adults or other animals does 

 not call forth. Such behavior is, of course, instinctive, and 

 indicates no more than that some distinction is made between 

 the appearance of a child and that of an adult or animal. More 

 over, no distinction is at first made between one child and another 

 any child calls forth the response. The child it sees on the 

 street while out in its go-cart meets the same response that is 

 given to the neighbor s child who is a constant visitor, or even 

 to its own reflection in the mirror. But very soon, if the child is 

 thrown with other children, distinctions between individuals are 



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