THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS 197 



2. The point of departure in the formation of the general con 

 cept is not in mere ideas but in concepts of objects. 



3. The resemblance which forms the bond of association is not 

 (generally speaking) between the ideas themselves, but between 

 the objects denoted by the general concept; and it is funda 

 mentally based upon similarity of import. 



4. The resemblance is such as to call for identical behavior in 

 characteristic situations; for it is this necessity for the uniformity 

 of conduct (in spite of individual differences) which fixes attention 

 upon the resemblance and conditions the association based upon 

 it. 



Thus far in our discussion of the general concept we have chiefly 

 concerned ourselves with earlier and simpler forms, in order to 

 discover the common characteristics of this type of cognitive 

 organization and its general function in the control of conduct. 

 We now wish to turn our attention to some of the characteristic 

 modifications which the general concept undergoes in the later 

 and more complex stages of mental evolution. These modifica 

 tions are immediately dependent on what we have tried to exhibit 

 as the most notable feature of the development of cognition, 

 namely the increasing indirectness of its control of conduct. 



It w r ill be recalled that in a former chapter pragmatists were 

 criticized as falling into a certain confusion in regard to the 

 end of conduct. The point was made, that while survival is 

 the primary end (in the sense that it is the essential condition 

 for the continuance of conduct), nevertheless it is equally true 

 that happiness also functions as an end in the same sense; and 

 that, moreover, happiness has come to be relatively independent, 

 and much more direct in its influence on the development of 

 conduct. It was further pointed out that what is a common 

 phenomenon of all sorts of activities is to be observed in connec 

 tion with theoretical activity, namely, that it comes to function 

 in relative independence of its original end. We can now see 

 more clearly why this must be so. As cognition grows more 



