PRAGMATISM AND THE FORM OF THOUGHT 215 



of all evolution, and forms a part, at least, of what is commonly 

 alluded to as the continuity of the process. It may, therefore, 

 naturally be expected, that among our concepts there are certain 

 ones which are not observably affected in the course of ordinary 

 experience, and thus stand to the whole of our thought as nearly 

 as possible in the relation of an a priori ground. Such we may 

 well enough designate the categories of our thought; but they 

 will obviously lack certain of the important characteristics that 

 have traditionally been associated with this term. They are not 

 forms of thought as distinguished from its content; they are not 

 final or unmodifiable; we cannot affirm that they are true of all 

 possible experience. In short, they are to be distinguished by no 

 hard and fast line from the other concepts of the understanding. 



What, then, is the practical use of the distinction? Simply 

 this: that, when we try to give an account of the concepts which 

 appear to be fundamental in all our thinking, we find that they 

 form a quite closely articulated system not so perfect, doubtless, 

 as the absolute idealist would have had us believe, but still a 

 system, and the most permanent factor in our thought. If we, 

 then, regard our present knowledge as a cross-section of an evolu 

 tionary process a loose procedure, if judged by too scrupulous 

 a standard, for our present knowledge continues its development 

 while we inspect it; but none the less a necessary procedure 

 the system of categories stands out as an a priori element in our 

 thinking, a pure form of thought, logically prior to all the par 

 ticularity of experience. That is to say, we find ourselves vir 

 tually at the standpoint of the critical philosophy with this 

 exception, indeed, that we do not regard it as an ultimate stand 

 point, and hence no longer expect a self-sufficient completeness 

 in the view of reality which it affords. In the sense of this 

 exception, the critical standpoint has, we believe, been trans 

 cended; but we must still return to it for observations of the 

 utmost scientific importance. 



It is in this light that we must regard the logical researches of 

 Kant s successors, and in particular those of Hegel. We have 



