DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



necessary; for we cannot see that this is ever the case. Where 

 a question is possible, doubt is always possible. But it is said 

 that to doubt may be practically the same as to accept one or 

 other of the given alternatives. This is true; and if the theory 

 in question referred to the wisdom of action instead of the validity 

 of belief, we should have no quarrel with it. But we must not 

 confuse the acting on a chance with a confidence in the outcome. 

 Hence in our statement of the will-to-believe principle, we have 

 included the state of doubt as a third real possibility; grouping it, 

 however, with the acceptance of one of the alternatives in such 

 a way as to leave the pragmatist position virtually unchanged. 



It must next be noted that, according to the premises laid 

 down, the happiness consequent upon belief is supposed to be 

 directly thus consequent not an after-effect of conduct dictated 

 by the belief, but the immediate effect of the belief itself. For 

 if the happiness were supposed to flow from a course of conduct, 

 then that same course of conduct would be equally dictated by 

 an uncertainty in the matter. That is to say, of two conflicting 

 courses of conduct, having apparently equal chances of success 

 or failure, a man would wisely choose the one which promised 

 the greater gain in proportion to the risk involved, even though 

 he had not the least confidence that a favorable rather than 

 an unfavorable issue would result. In other words, an absolute 

 uncertainty as to the result would logically warrant the same 

 course of conduct as would be warranted by an entire conviction 

 as to the certainty of a favorable outcome. The happiness pro 

 posed must, therefore, be conceived to be a direct fruit of the 

 belief as such. How far this is removed from the spirit of prag 

 matism need not be emphasized. 



In order to escape this interpretation a new premise must be 

 added to those above specified; namely, that even though the 

 same conduct might be dictated by belief and by doubt, yet only 

 the belief in the particular outcome could so strengthen a man 

 as to enable him to act in the manner necessary for success. 

 Now this is by no means an impossible supposition, and it is 



