226 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



is to be. It is eternal in the sense that in its development it is 

 wholly self-determined. Hegel interprets this last statement as 

 implying that the development is logical rather than temporal ; 

 the historical process, he finds, contains much that is irrevelant 

 and non-essential. But it is a caricature of his teachings to 

 declare that the entire development exists now, except in the sense 

 in which the oak is present in the acorn. And apart from con 

 siderations extracted from Hegel s works w r e are aware of no 

 inducement that has been offered for the acceptance of such a 

 doctrine. 



In insisting upon the reality of change, the humanist is thus 

 in partial agreement with absolute idealism. According to the 

 latter, some change is real (or actual, if we hold to the more 

 precise Hegelian terminology) , namely, evolution. Indeed, Hegel 

 in his day believed his philosophy to be distinguished from the 

 older rationalism, by his acceptance of a developing reality; and 

 the criticisms which his dialectic had then, as more recently, 

 to endure from conservative thinkers are exceedingly similar 

 to some which his present-day successors are urging against 

 humanism. 



The radical difference between the humanistic position and 

 absolute idealism lies between the pluralism of the former and 

 the monism of the latter. Even this difference may easily be 

 exaggerated. It must not be forgotten that Hegel believed in 

 the presence of an element of contingency in all phenomena, 

 though he regarded this as merely evanescent. Only the rational , 

 that which is bound up with the constitution of the universe, 

 could endure. The humanist, on the other hand, believes that 

 the universe contains within itself agencies which are not com 

 pletely determined in their activity by the universe as a whole, 

 but which may, to an indefinite extent, affect the future history 

 of the universe. That is to say, humanism (in the sense here 

 treated) is a theory of the freedom of the will. The distinctive 

 character of the theory comes from its supposed connection with 

 the pragmatist logic to which we must now turn. 



